

APPENDIX E: STAKEHOLDER MEETING
MINUTES/CORRESPONDENCE

FORMER NEBRASKA ORDNANCE PLANT
OU3 PUBLIC MEETING
ORDNANCE & EXPLOSIVES RECURRING REVIEW
HELD IN MEAD, NEBRASKA

DATE: MARCH 5, 2007

TIME: 7:00 P.M.

Reported by: Susan McKenzie

Videographer: John Thomas

(Whereupon, the following proceedings were had, to-wit:)

GARTH ANDERSON: We're now going to start the Ordnance & Explosives Recurring Review portion of the meeting. What I'd like to do is have Mary Lyle lead this discussion. She's been involved in the OE portion of the project for a number of years.

So take it away, Mary.

MARY LYLE: Thank you, Garth.

As I talk today, there are two handouts over on the table that will have a lot more detail. The slides kind of were taken from this fact sheet for Ordnance & Explosives Recurring Review. And I also want to point out a public availability session comment form which we'd like you guys to fill out if you have any information on OE at the site. And I'll kind of touch on that a little bit more as I walk through the slides.

The reason we do -- it's a five-year OE Recurring Review. It's basically a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers requirement that we do this. And we just want to make sure that previous OE Response Actions that we conducted at the site continue to be protective of human health and the environment. And

the way that we go about doing a recurring review is we look at historical documentation. The first OE Review we did back in 2001, we basically combed the entire administrative record for all three OUs to try and find historical information on the OE sites. We also -- every five years, which is why we're doing this again, we're going to look at current site conditions to see if there have been any land use changes or any accessibility changes or anything new that has come up in the past five years regarding our OE Response Actions that we've done. And the way that we get some of that new information is from doing community interviews, conducting a public availability session, which we had before this meeting. The questionnaires here that we have out on the table we're going to -- we've distributed those to you all here. And then we were supposed to have a site visit today, but unfortunately the weather kind of prohibited that. So as soon as we get dried up out here a little bit, we'll reschedule that. We actually go out to the sites where we previously conducted OE Response Actions and walk through those and get pictures and make sure that we know what's going on there today. And finally, after we do all that, we'll compile it into a report that we'll put

out this summer.

And the process that we go through for our Army guidance here is we ask three questions about the OE Response Action, are they functioning as we originally intended, are all the assumptions that we made initially, are those still valid, and then is there any new information that would lead us to believe that those OE response actions are not protective.

And there are five sites that we focused on as areas of interest for OE. And here's kind of a map -- actually on your handouts, the culvert area is misrepresented. I think we initially had it on the east side of Load Line 1 plume, but we've corrected the slide here, it's actually on the west side of the Load Line 1 plume. And I'm going to try and talk loudly, but I'm going to go over to this map over here. We have an aerial photo here where we've kind of boxed out on the culvert area so you can kind of just see on an aerial photo what's over here. Site 5, we did a clearance -- and I'll show some pictures actually. It's kind of a six-acre plot of land where we cleared four feet off the surface for Ordnance and Explosives. And then there's kind of a little hodge-podge at the other four areas

around the NRD reservoir, the potential landfill area that we talked a little bit about in OU3, another landfill area kind of to the southeast of the reservoir, the proving range, which is Site 9, and then the north burning ground which is Site 10. So if you want to come up here after we're done later on, it might be a little bit more clear. And all of these areas are actually not on -- they're not privately owned. It's university property or Army property.

And just to kind of go through the history a little bit, we've had four I guess Removal/Response Actions for OE. And the first one, as I talked about on Site 5, we cleared a six-acre plot of land where we actually took four feet off of the top of the six-acre land to clear for OE and then we filled it back in. And I'll show actually a picture of the area what it looks now today. And that area has been cleared for non-intrusive activities, and it can still -- but for the purposes of this Removal Action, it's been cleared for OE for that top four feet.

As Lisa was talking about a little bit, when they drained the reservoir percent of the OU3 supplemental RI work, there were some partial

bomblets that were exposed that were underneath the shoreline, and we had a bomb squad come out and remove those. And that was another Response Action that we had.

The CWM acronym stands for chemical warfare materiel. And there was some concern that there had been some buried at this site. And so we did some monitoring well sampling for several years around that area to look for contaminants that would be associated with that chemical warfare materiel. And then we also put up signage and actually worked with the university to put up signs and fencing around Site 5, 8, and the NRD reservoir.

Here's going to be a series of photos. Back beyond this fence is Site 5 where we cleared that six-acre land, plot of land. And this is kind of just another view of that. And there's a creek kind of along the side here.

This is a picture of the potential bomblet that we found as the NRD reservoir was lowered and we had that removed.

The landfill area, Site 8, these pictures I should -- sorry, I should have clarified that before -- but were taken when we did the 2001 Recurring Review. So when we go out again this year,

we'll try and have a photo log of the pictures as we do the evaluation again this year.

Here's another picture of Site 8 where the former treatment plan is located.

And then this is just an example of one of the signs that's outside the NRD reservoir that has been posted to warn people about the potential for Ordnance in this area.

And as I mentioned before, we did our first Recurring Review in 2001, which was roughly about five years after we cleared the culvert area, Site 5. And that document -- we didn't have any land use changes or accessibility changes to these five areas that we looked at, and we didn't have any new OE incidents since we originally conducted those Response Actions for OE.

I kind of went quickly through this. I'll take any questions if you have any on the OE.

MELISSA KONECKY: I'm Melissa Konecky.

What about the mustard gas?

MARY LYLE: The mustard [agent] is associated with the chemical warfare materiel that we looked for. And actually documented in the -- kind of in the appendix of the OE Recurring Review report,

we tried to document several interviews that we had with people. Someone had brought it to our attention. We physically -- during the time we were conducting the Removal Actions, we physically met with these people and asked them to take us out to the site and show us, you know, where you think they were. And I think that instituted sampling of wells.

Did we -- were the wells existing, Lisa, or did we install some wells for just the purpose of -- we did install some new wells for the purpose of --

GARTH ANDERSON: Yes, we installed a monitoring well network around the landfill specifically to monitor for what had been the only breakdown products possible from this particular substance. And after many, many, many years of monitoring, nothing ever showed up. The compound we were looking for is called Thiodiglycol. Nothing has ever shown up in our monitoring.

MELISSA KONECKY: Well, what about the incident where it was smelled in '79?

GARTH ANDERSON: Well, I just happened to read that one this year. If you read the account, what was actually hit did not actually exhibit the

characteristics of mustard. It was like some other substance or it could have been an aerosol can or something. But given the description of the incident, it was not -- it could not have been related to mustard itself.

MELISSA KONECKY: Did you say then that the people who used to work there and who reported mustard gas being dumped, that you went there with them? Is that what you --

MARY LYLE: Well, some of the accounts that we had heard -- I'm not sure if it was actually the person that made the account or people that worked on the facility that talked to someone who made the account, but we physically came out and had appointments one on one with people, and they actually took us out to some of these sites where we did do some sort of evaluation of the OE there and the chemical warfare materiel. So I'm not sure if it was the exact person or just people who could account for those comments.

MELISSA KONECKY: It was just brought to my attention today that this Appendix G of EPA concerns the document that it was contained in was just posted today actually on your website. And, you know, it would sure be nice if we had this stuff a

little earlier, at least seven days ahead, so that we would have a chance to look at it. I mean, you know, my computer barely downloaded and printed just the appendix in time for me to get here and not even be able to review it beforehand. So we need to have this significant stuff like at least a week ahead of time.

GARTH ANDERSON: It was in the Mead Public Library as well.

MELISSA KONECKY: Well, and that's been closed.

GARTH ANDERSON: I understand. You had a little weather incident up here this last week.

MELISSA KONECKY: Yeah. And so --

LYNN MOORER: I'd just underscore that this a perfect example of this document, this Recurring Review that was done in 2002 is a big fat document. And it's only because I've been spending a lot of time at DEQ recently that I had any opportunity to review that prior to this meeting. That really is an example of something that needs to be posted on the website seven days prior to the meeting at least if you're going to have any sort of meaningful public review -- or public comment.

Anyhow, let me talk a little more about the chemical warfare materiel investigations.

These EPA comments are pretty devastating I would say, in terms of their assessment of the level of investigation that the Army did for this Recurring Review in 2002, or the review that culminated in the 2002 report. They note that with respect to this chemical warfare materiel, specifically the reports regarding the mustard gas, there were two interviewees who stated unequivocally in 1993 that ordnance containing mustard gas were buried at the landfill. And then one of these individuals said that eight cylinders, two of which were leaking, were placed in 55-gallon drums for shipping and were sent -- and they believe they were sent to the NOP. And the EPA's review of this information and what had been done was that they noted that your review, the Army's review, was completely inadequate with respect to this on several points. And let me go through those.

Information from the three interviewees strongly supports the probability, the strong probability that mustard gas ordnance was buried at the landfill, yet, the Army judged -- you discounted that because you said this was not

indisputable evidence.

Well, I submit to you, indisputable evidence is not the proper standard for you to be doing inquiry as to potential hazards. That's ridiculous. 15:04

Secondly, the fact Thioidiglycol had not been detected downstream, EPA said in their comments that doesn't mean that chemical weapons materiel isn't present, it may simply mean that the integrity of the weapon is still intact and has not yet leaked. And then your response to that, you simply fell back on this, well, because there's no historical documentation, the accounts from these previous employees have not been substantiated by the Army. Well, there's clearly a strong probability right there, and you have a scientific explanation for why your monitoring wells that haven't turned up Thioidiglycol. That isn't a good measure. The fact that nothing has turned up doesn't indisputably rule out the fact that this mustard gas was buried there as these three individuals indicate. Likewise, you conclude simply by saying the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers believes it is unlikely that this substance was buried at the former NOP.

I submit to you based upon many of

these extremely strongly worded deficiencies that EPA noted in your preliminary assessment, in your extent of geophysical investigations, deficiencies in the selection and the testing of geophysical instruments, deficiencies in site documentation and deficiencies in chemical warfare materiel investigations, that ultimately all the Army did with respect to your 2002 analysis was you relied heavily upon faith-based inquiry instead of rigorous scientific analysis. That's not good enough. You went to great lengths to discount ever bit of evidence there was about mustard gas. So I want to know, what geophysical investigations have you done to locate mustard gas, these containers, which the information indicates were placed in 55-gallon drums and sent to NOP for shipping for disposal? I'm asking you geophysical investigations.

GARTH ANDERSON: We did not do -- I have to go back and look. I can't give you an exact answer right now. That will be part of our response to this. And I owe you an answer on that.

But as far as Operable Unit 3, at the time that was part of the scope, that we had agreed that no intrusive activities would be done in the landfill, which is standard practice, that instead

said we would look for breakdown products as an indicator of its presence. Now, I'm not saying there even is mustard [agent] in the landfill. But even assuming there was, probably the worst thing you could do is to go out there and start digging for it, because that would create even a greater risk than just leaving it where it is.

LYNN MOORER: Aren't there other ways to test for things beneath the soil other than just digging obviously?

GARTH ANDERSON: Geophysical doesn't -- there's a lot of stuff in the landfill. And in order to distinguish between one thing or another is extremely difficult. When you're out in an open area where you do geophysical and you find an anomaly, then that's much simpler. But when you're in a landfill where there's washing machines and car bodies and, you know, who knows what else is in there, you know, extremely difficult to pinpoint something like that.

LYNN MOORER: I might be wrong, but I thought I saw on the map -- perhaps it's one of the PowerPoint -- that shows the area though of this potential chemical weapon disposal was out off to the southeast, it wasn't in the landfill.

Let me find it.

SCOTT MARQUESS: I think it was allegedly north of the landfill. I think an individual had a -- there was a meeting out there, and I think he pointed out the area in general, maybe in the '93, '94 time frame.

Let me try and address a few things here. We have some late breaking information on this as of Friday afternoon actually that's kind of interesting. A couple of things. First off, I'm not aware of any geophysical activity to specifically locate mustard [agent], number one. Number two, I don't believe that you would be able to distinguish mustard [agent] or anything else in that area because of all the material that's out there. You're going to find all sorts of things. You're not going to see anything that's going to say, ding, ding, ding, ding, here's something like mustard [agent]. I don't think you would be able to do that.

But take a step back. We talked with the State Project Manager, Melissa Kemling. She works on the Offutt Air Force Base site. And as of Friday afternoon -- and I don't think you guys are probably aware of this -- she sent us a copy of an incident report from Offutt that speaks to probably

this situation. I don't know if you guys have seen this or not. I think it was October 1960. But they had an incident at Offutt where mustard was leaking and they had to respond. The incident report says that the material was buried at Offutt. There is some -- so there's inconsistency as to whether it was buried at Offutt or they brought it here. And that's from the people who were firsthand on-scene responders.

So that doesn't necessarily clarify anything, but I believe there were three individuals who reported that mustard [agent] as buried here. The incident report from Offutt doesn't substantiate that. So I don't know why the inconsistency.

LINDA WAGEMAN: Linda Wageman.

I'm going to argue this. A couple of years ago I had received a telephone call from one of our local NRD members and on the behalf of individuals in this community who were responsible for guarding these drums as they came from Offutt, who advised me of the situation and advised me that there was in fact, A, mustard gas, and B, nerve gas. When I found this information out, I contacted Scott and I told him specifically what I had found out. Now, both he and Dr. -- I can't remember his last

name -- thank you -- Dr. Zurbuchen went ahead and they did some research on this.

I was advised -- and evidently now I'm making this up, which irritates me to no end. But I was advised that the drums did in fact come from Offutt. And I can't cite the 1963 interview, but I remember being told explicitly of the location of a 1992 document where it was advised that there was someone whose responsibility it was to physically dig up these drums that were buried in Offutt to move them.

So I don't disagree with Melissa at all that those drums were buried at Offutt. But it sounds to me as if the whole story isn't being completed here. Because what we have here, gentlemen, is you've got a series of local residents whose job it was to work at the plant, whose job -- they were in the military. This was their job. And they are telling you what's out there. And then you in turn are telling them that they are in fact wrong.

GARTH ANDERSON: Thank you.

LYNN MOORER: I found the map that I was searching for. This is a part of the Recurring Report -- OE Recurring Review Report for 2002. And

this is Figure 3-1. So this portion that I've got -- where my finger is that's highlighted, you see that's where it says, "Approximate location of suspect CWM burial." And that is much farther -- it is not in the landfill. It is much farther southeast. It's by the bridge Linda says. The Figure 3-1, "Sites" -- and it's labeled "Sites Relevant to the Reported Disposal of CWM at the Former Nebraska Ordnance Plant.

LINDA WAGEMAN: Lynn, all they need to do is go back --

THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We can't get it on the record.

LINDA WAGEMAN: You'll get it on now.

All you need to do is go back to your notes from previous RAB meetings of I would say maybe about a year and a half to two years ago. And providing that your notes are as explicit and detailed as you have been telling us for years, you will find this documentation.

Now, naturally it's probably not there because it's kind of a hit and miss as to what you guys choose to put in there. But I guarantee you we've got it on tape. And it is there. So what you guys need to do is you need to look for it. Because

I'm telling you right now, it's got to be there, you're going to find it, you're going to move heaven and earth, and you're going to find all of the financial funds necessary to rip that place apart until you can say on your life that it is not there. And you can't do that. And as far as equipment, telling us, oh, it's not there, we can't find this, there are archeologists all over the world that have these little devices that can find cities below cities below cities. And these guys aren't the Army. I don't understand why you can't do that. I know you can. You probably have a few of those machines scattered around. So don't turn around and tell me that you're not capable of doing it because you are. It's a matter of what you're willing to do and what you're not willing to do. And damnit, you will do it.

LYNN MOORER: I would like to note that among the many things that are very troubling about EPA's comments from 2002 is the repeated notation that you all did a very inadequate document search or paper type investigation with respect to looking for documentation. And the commenter noted in comment 3D that -- and these are comments prepared by TechLaw, who's a contractor for EPA -- it says, "It

should be noted that based on TechLaw's experience at other Army and military sites across the nation, systematic and comprehensive production and disposal records are not typically maintained. It is therefore not an uncommon occurrence for unexpected source areas to be identified throughout the RI/FS process," close quote.

So that's basically saying what they have said repeatedly in the previous comments, about three or four pages worth, is just because you didn't find documentation that supports what any of these interviewees said does not mean it's not so. As a matter of fact, to the contrary based upon TechLaw's experience, and this was apparently adopted by EPA, that it is unusual to find systematic and thorough documentation of this sort. And so your inability or lack of finding this documentation should not be used as a rationale for failing to carry out further investigation.

But all throughout the Corps consistently answered many of EPA's concerns by saying that because there was no documentation to indicate that certain activities were carried out at a particular location, therefore, there was no need to investigate further. I would like the record to

reflect I find that extremely troubling. I am very concerned about that attitude.

There are countless examples I know in my experience all across the country of dangerous materials that are being buried in undocumented places. Once it becomes known that a place is a dump, all manner of things end up there. So please let the record reflect and please understand that my concern is extreme with respect to your inadequate investigation to this point as to any unexploded, exploded, any sort of related explosives or ordnance type devices on the site. And the criticism that EPA provided you in 2002 I think is quite scathing on balance. There are 18 pages of very tough criticism here.

I would like to know, Mr. Marquess, what is the status of these comments, or shall we say, do these continue to be EPA's views of where the situation was as of the time this was printed in 2002? Do you understand what I'm asking? Has there been some sort of an update or a change in view on EPA's part with respect to the areas that are critiqued here?

SCOTT MARQUESS: Well, I would say we still support those comments. And part of what we're

going to do as part of the rest of OU3 is to incorporate -- is to make sure that all the ordnance related issues are wrapped up and addressed in our remedy, be it land use controls, be it any other need for any other intrusive remediation, whatever, we want to wrap all those things up including ordnance in the final OU3 ROD.

LINDA WAGEMAN: Back to the gas stuff. So the people out here are telling the Army there's junk out here. The Army puts the blindfold on, attempts to walk a straight line, says, oh, we don't see anything, while looking in the wrong spot, and yet we say -- and there are many, many, many of us, and I could count you on the one hand, and you're saying no. I want to know what you're going to do about it. Because I'm going to be honest. I'm tired of coming here and fighting for rights. I don't think I should ever have to be in attendance here. But when it comes to mustard and nerve gas and my reputation for being a liar, which takes it to a very strong personal level for me, that's where we cross the line, boys. And I want to know what the Army is prepared to do knowing that we have a conflict here.

Now, Garth, you may or may not be authorized to answer that question. And if that's

the case, I respect that. But also understand, like I have in the past, I will get an answer to this.

GARTH ANDERSON: And your answer is correct that I can't commit to any action at this point. We have different offices in the Corps of Engineers that specialize in Ordnance and Explosives. And, you know, they take the technical lead on that, and we do -- we perform actions that are reasonable and thorough and, you know, in accordance with all the standards. So I can't say specifically what the Army would do. We certainly appreciate the public comment and the input on this to bring things to our attention that we may not have known before.

LINDA WAGEMAN: Well, that's -- thank you for that response. You have known about it. It's in your notes. I followed up on it a couple of years ago. This data came from me from an NRD member and then proceeded to get reconfirmed and reconfirmed over the course of time. I did my duty as a citizen and as a resident to put the EPA on alert, and then they turned around and did the checking. So this isn't anything new. You know, we've got all this stuff on tape. You guys have been advised of it. We know that the trucks came in at night. We know that they were dumped at night. We know where they came

from. We know primarily where they're located, and they're not in the landfill. They're near it, but they're not there. So if the Army's response is, we've done an adequate job, I would like to know in what. Because it's obviously not note taking; it's obviously not listening to the community; it's obviously not follow-up; it's obviously not working in succession with the EPA; and it's obviously not in working hard and diligently to protect the citizens of this community. We are not talking about pesticides.

Again, as I've mentioned to you, this is a project to you and it's your pension; it's life to us out here. So we really need as human beings to be diligent on this and stop thinking of this situation as this is my role because I work for these people or this is my role because I work for these people. Because in the end it doesn't matter, it honest to God does not matter.

You said a couple of years ago you couldn't add monitoring wells because you didn't have the money. The people in this community fought and bickered and yelled and screamed. And Garth, you weren't here at that time. I was on the phone with your chief; I was on the phone with your Colonel.

And miraculously one and a half million dollars was found to incorporate more monitoring wells. Now, I'm sure we robbed Peter to pay Paul. That's what Steve told me. But the reality is they were a necessity, and the necessity was met. I'm expecting the same thing to go with the mustard gas.

LYNN MOORER: I underscore what Linda just said. For the record, on the map on Figure 3-1, I think I figured out with Mr. Marquess' help that this area off to the southeast is actually the legend for the map. That's not the actual location you see. But we are talking about being in the landfill. So I do want to clarify that.

One last question I wanted to ask about the reservoir. I did find in this documentation that indicates that the reservoir was lowered in 1999. Through the remedial investigation of OU3, approximately 25 feet of shoreline was exposed when the water level was lowered. So clearly the reservoir wasn't even close to being drained or made in a semi-dry state.

My question then for you is, has the reservoir including the submerged areas been screened or searched for Ordnance and Explosives in a thorough fashion, the whole reservoir? Because

partially expended bomblets, an old bomb fuse and spent booster caps were found on the shoreline in 1999. It's possible and probably likely that there are a lot more ordnance and explosives farther into the reservoir in addition to whatever other junk was already there as Lorus said. Has a complete screening or searching for the reservoir occurred with respect to ordnance or explosives?

GARTH ANDERSON: We screened as far as the reservoir was drained.

LYNN MOORER: The 25 feet?

GARTH ANDERSON: Yes.

LYNN MOORER: But that's it?

GARTH ANDERSON: I'll have to get you an exact answer on that. I don't have that right here. We have to go back and confirm what was actually done.

LYNN MOORER: Well, please accept this as a very strongly held suggestion or request, that the entire reservoir needs to be screened. You need to figure out a way to screen that entire thing for ordnance and explosives. Just doing 25 feet down the shoreline is in no way sufficient.

Would you agree, Lorus?

LORUS LUETKENHAUS: (Nods head).

LINDA WAGEMAN: Or we can pretend none of this exists. And we'll even write a report on the same.

GARTH ANDERSON: Okay. Well, I think that we have reached 9:00 o'clock. You may have heard the HVAC system shut down. I don't know if that's the university's clue that they're trying to go home. So I really do appreciate everyone's cooperation tonight in letting us get through the slide presentation and leaving us a maximum amount of time for questions and answers. I think it was a very good exchange, and I hope we can do this like this into the future. Thank you.

(9:00 p.m. - meeting adjourned).

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

STATE OF NEBRASKA)
) ss.
COUNTY OF DOUGLAS)

I, SUSAN M. MCKENZIE, General Notary Public within and for the State of Nebraska, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceedings were taken by me in shorthand and thereafter reduced to typewriting by use of Computer-Aided Transcription; that the foregoing twenty-seven (27) pages contain a full, true and correct transcription of all of the testimony of said witness to the best of my ability;

That I am not a kin or in any way associated with any of the parties to said cause of action, or their counsel, and that I am not interested in the event thereof.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto affix my signature and seal this 2nd day of April, 2007.

SUSAN MCKENZIE
General Notary Public

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:

FORMER NEBRASKA ORDNANCE PLANT
OU3 PUBLIC MEETING
ORDNANCE & EXPLOSIVES RECURRING REVIEW
HELD IN MEAD, NEBRASKA

DATE: MARCH 5, 2007
TIME: 7:00 P.M.

COST CERTIFICATE

I, SUSAN M. MCKENZIE, General Notary Public
within and for the State of Nebraska, do hereby
certify that the following costs should be assessed
in the above-entitled matter to:

FORMER NEBRASKA ORDNANCE PLANT/ OU3 PUBLIC
MEETING/ORDNANCE & EXPLOSIVES RECURRING REVIEW
DATE TAKEN: MARCH 5, 2007
AMOUNT: \$ _____
DELIVERED TO: BRADY BIGELOW (ECC)
DATE DELIVERED: _____ day of _____, 2007.

SUSAN M. MCKENZIE,
General Notary Public

—
My Commission Expires:

Mead - Post RAB Action Items (Oct 2007 RAB) – Updated 1/25/08

No	Question or Follow-up Action	Remarks
1	Send letter to those with wells being tested and those who have requested their wells be tested about non containment	<p>The Containment Evaluation Fact Sheet was included in the October 2007 RAB meeting invitation that was sent to all persons on the mailing list.</p> <p>The Army has reviewed and updated the mailing list to ensure completeness.</p> <p>The Army and EPA are finalizing plans for the first phase of containment restoration actions. When complete, these plans will be described in an updated fact sheet and sent to all landowners on the updated Mead mailing list and posted on the web site.</p>
2	Insert domestic well locations on map(pg 55 of transcript), include it in notification sent to landowners about non-containment (see question 1)	<p>Containment evaluation maps now have domestic well locations depicted. This map has been posted to the project web site and will be provided at the January 29, 2008 Open House. This map will also be incorporated into the updated fact sheet.</p> <p>See response to Issue #1.</p>
3	Identify wells that would be impacted based upon modeling (even if not currently impacted), notify landowners if their wells will be impacted.	Based on the model, WSW-51A was identified as a well that could be impacted in the future but was, at the time, not impacted. It has since been found to contain detectable levels of TCE. The data has been provided to the landowner.
4	Provide handouts and material to be discussed at the RAB 1 week prior to RAB (or post on website)	Ongoing
5	Quality Control Summary Report (QCSR) for 2 nd Q 2007 sampling event not at NDEQ.	The QCSR for 2 nd Q 2007 has been provided to NDEQ twice. The QCSR was provided to NDEQ prior to the October RAB and received by NDEQ on October 9, 2007 at 8:50 am. Since it was indicated that the QCSR was not able to be located at NDEQ, a second copy was sent and received by NDEQ on October 26, 2007 at 9:04 am.

No	Question or Follow-up Action	Remarks
6	Post QCSRs on web site	Located on website at: http://www.nwk.usace.army.mil/projects/mead/Sampling_Results.html
7	Requested specific language on signs posted along Johnson Creek to indicate TCE is present, not just "NO TRESPASSING"	 <p data-bbox="1392 378 1816 833">Signs posted that read "No Trespassing, Surface Water Exposure Health Hazard". No specific reference to DoD, Army, or USACE (due to there also being a likely exposure hazard to non- DoD chemicals such as agricultural pesticides, herbicides, and nitrates). Signs installed week of 3 December 2007 on all properties whose owners allowed them. ECC to place sign locations on a map and maintain a log of owners contacted for permissions.</p>
8	Committed in Aug 2007 RAB that Corps would talk to all landowners along Johnson Creek. Committed at Oct 2007 RAB to make personal contact with all landowners	USACE and ECC personally contacted landowners along Johnson creek during DEC 07 sampling event in person. See narrative on No. 7.
9	Show TCE in LL2 on maps (including big wall map)	URS will provide TCE data from Fall 2007 DP investigation to ECC when validation is complete. New TCE plume interpretation will be included on future maps upon validation. Anticipate validated data will be available in early February. Validated data will be posted to the website in March 2008.
10	Trend charts do not match data on interactive spreadsheet – need to double check to ensure they match or provide explanation	The data contained in the interactive spreadsheet is "normalized" to allow for proper trending evaluation. Normalization is the process of reducing a complex data structure into its simplest most stable structures. We adjust the non-detect reporting limits to a single value because these values change over time and from lab to lab. If the values are not normalized, the graphs will show nonexistent trends. For instance, if one lab has a reporting limit of 0.01 and the next lab has a

No	Question or Follow-up Action	Remarks
		reporting limit of 0.05, the graphs will show an upward trend that does not exist. We solve this problem by adjusting the reporting limits to the higher value. Thus, some of the values may be different from the actual data reports. However, the intent of trend analysis is maintained.
11	Hard to find well locations. Requested: be able to type in well # and zoom in to well location on maps.	Well reference sheet using existing Section Numbers has been developed and will be attached to hard copy maps provided at meetings. Zoom feature has been added to electronic version of map posted to the web site.
12	MW-99 concern that this is listed as a perimeter well and Corps has stated that there is no TCE in perimeter wells, yet MW-99 as TCE. Need to alter Table 6-16 to remove MW-99 as a perimeter well because it is not a perimeter well. Issue change page?	Review of RAB meeting video indicates public referenced Table 6-16 of "the report". A handout from a previous RAB was also referenced; however review of this data did not indicate MW-99 was referenced as a perimeter well. Review of the RAB presentation slide 12 from the August 2007 RAB found no references to MW-99 as a perimeter well. Note that MW-99 IS NOT a perimeter well. Please provide the name of the report, the table number and the page or appendix so that we can locate the data in question to determine if a correction is required.
13	Sample Ski Lake in December, continue with more frequent sampling	Sampling completed in December 2007, preliminary results indicate no detections of contaminants of concern. Validated results will be available in February 2008. USACE also committed to sample the Ski Lake in 2008, at a frequency to be determined as the GMP is evaluated for 2008.
14	Corps committed that if there is a TCE concentration of 5ug/L or more in any of the new 17 wells, we will move the 1 mile boundary out further in the area of the exceedance.	Will evaluate when data from Fall sampling has been validated. Fall sampling data validation is expected to be completed in early February 2008. The 1 mile buffer is based on the current extent of contamination, which can be updated as new data dictates. If a concentration of a DOD contaminant exceeds a MCL where there was previously no detection or below a MCL, we will follow the resampling protocol and then, as indicated by verification data, adjust the plume outline and locally adjust the 1-mile buffer accordingly.
15	Review well permits, provide a list to assure all wells installed are identified	This is an ongoing action, therefore, list will continually change. Current list will be provided at next RAB. While the Corps will continue to make every effort to identify all wells through county records, identification of new construction, and potentially other means, not every resident will have a well permit and we cannot know with 100% certainty that all wells are accounted for.

No	Question or Follow-up Action	Remarks
16	Reevaluate testing of irrigation wells (in the context of vapor exposure)	Awaiting validation of EPA's Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer (TAGA) data from an irrigation well that was specifically tested for vapors. Evaluation and update of technical memo will be performed upon receipt of validated TAGA data. Additionally, University well IR-16 and the irrigation well north of the Bovine treatment area will be tested in Spring 2008 and that data will be used in the evaluation. Further testing will be dependent upon the results of this evaluation.
17	Provide OE results to RAB/public – 12 wells sampled. Post on web site.	June 2007 results are posted on the NOP project website.
18	Show where signs are posted based on where mustard was found	The exact location of the buried mustard agent at the Former NOP site is unknown. The majority of information regarding mustard agent burial indicates a small volume (5 or 6 canisters) was buried in the ARDC landfill area and eventually covered with other disposed material. Signs are currently posted on the fence that surrounds the ARDC landfill. There is one eye witness account that places burial of mustard agent approximately 50 feet north of the ARDC landfill perimeter fence. The closest sign is approximately 50 feet from the area indicated by the eye witness. The witness reported that he did not actually observe the burial. Please note that the actual location of the reported mustard agent burial is not known with certainty. See discussion in Issue #19.
19	Find out why the OE recurring review did not mention the 1994 info provided by eye witness regarding location of mustard. 2001 OE Recurring Review on pg G14 and G15 says don't know where mustard located.	Persons who authored the 2001 OE Recurring Review were questioned regarding why the OE recurring review did not mention the 1994 information provided by an eye witness. The authors interviewed indicated the location of the mustard agent burial was not known with certainty. There are conflicting accounts/records (by an eye witness and from former Offutt AFB personnel/records) regarding the dates and locations of presumed mustard agent disposal on the former NOP property. There is also information that indicates one mustard agent disposal event that was claimed to have occurred on NOP property did not occur. The eye witness account of the mustard agent being located approximately 50 feet outside the existing perimeter fence of the ARDC landfill. However, the eyewitness's account claims that his recollection was hazy and he

No	Question or Follow-up Action	Remarks
		did not observe the actual location of burial. Testing and investigations to locate the mustard agent have been conducted and no evidence of buried mustard agent has been found. All documentation of the mustard burial events will be included in the 2007 OE Recurring Review Report.
20	Trend Graphs for RAB GMP update— Make the 5 and 2 ug/L action level lines on each of the graphs more visible (thicker)	All new graphs have been generated with thicker action level lines and these will be available 7 days prior to the next RAB.
21	Define “limited periods” as used in MUD’s 404 Permit.	This question was asked at the August RAB meeting and an answer was provided on the NOP project web site. That answer is: The only applicable operating conditions related to withdrawal limitations for both MUD’s Section 404 Permit (#199910085) and its State of Nebraska Transfer Permit (A-17356) is a maximum daily withdrawal rate of 104 MGD and an average annual withdrawal rate of 52 MGD. There are no restrictions related to limiting pumping to a defined number of days.
22	Corps’ definition of “site”. When Corps refers to “site”, are you referring to former NOP boundary, extent of contamination, or block identified in ROD.	There are multiple definitions for the term “site” in relation to an environmental project and we would likely use the term differently in different contexts. The “site” can mean the physical real estate boundary of the former NOP, the area that is encompassed by groundwater contamination, a specific area in which we are working (e.g., AOP site). There is no one answer. Overall, anything that encompasses contamination is the Corps’ responsibility to address as part of this project.
23	Verify with CX if technology is available for identifying mustard (CAIS, etc)	The USACE Huntsville Center of Expertise for Chemical Warfare Material indicated that topographic analysis, geophysical survey, and monitoring for CWM breakdown products are the current means of identifying CWM burial locations. Topographical and monitoring efforts have been conducted at the NOP site and none have confirmed the presence of CWM. No new, proven technologies have emerged since the last investigation. Because the mustard agent was buried and additional landfill debris was placed on top of the agent, geophysical survey will not provide reliable information for locating the agent.

No	Question or Follow-up Action	Remarks
24	Request NWO representative attend next RAB meeting to address MUD permit issues	Discussions with Omaha District are ongoing. It is unlikely that the Omaha District will attend an NOP RAB meeting to discuss MUD permit issues. If their Commander decides it is required, then a separate meeting addressing only MUD issues would be held.
25	Fact Sheets – make sure maps are updated on fact sheets sent out	Fact sheets include plume maps showing the estimated 5 ug/L concentration lines. These maps are derived from the most recent validated data available.
26	Verify all documents received by NDEQ and placed in Mead Library (date delivered and receipt signature)	U.S. Mail Delivery Receipt and/or Date Stamped verification of all reports sent to NDEQ and EPA are obtained. Corps continually checks to ensure that regulators receive the reports.
27	Verify all documents loaded on website	Interactive spreadsheet with historical data plots loaded 1-3-08 and updated on 1-24-08. Other files updated or posted as they become available will include the site map, sampling results, fact sheets, and final documents.
28	Review document list on Mead Library computer and create mirror image that can be accessed during the meeting	A mirror image will be created the day before each RAB meeting (once RAB meetings resume). During the meeting, these files will be able to be accessed for data and to verify that all files are currently available electronically.